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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Major General John A. Wickham, USA
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT:

Implementation of Recommendations of the
Rockefeller Commission

As you know on June 11 the President requested the Department of Defense and other agencies to comment on the recommendations of the Commission on CIA Activities within the U. S. (Rockefeller Commission). The comments of all agencies have been received and the office of the White House Counsel is preparing to submit its recommendations to the President. Prior to doing so, Secretary Kissinger asked that we insure that Secretary Schlesinger's views are reflected in the paper.

It is the consensus of the White House staff that the thirty recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission may be broken into two categories. The first category contains those twenty recommendations which are relatively non-controversial and concern reform measures internal to CIA (recommendations 6, 9-13, 14-B, 15B-C, 16-18, 20, 22-25, 27, 28, 29 and 30). It is the tentative recommendation of the President's principal White House advisers that these recommendations be implemented forthwith by the DCI in coordination with the Attorney General, as appropriate.

Of the ten remaining recommendations, two concern Congressional action and do not require Presidential decision at this time (the establishment of a joint Congressional committee on intelligence and Congressional consideration of the desirability of making portions of the CIA budget public). A third recommendation to the effect that the DCI should be a man of integrity, stature and wisdom is hortatory and requires no specific Presidential action at this time.

On the remaining seven recommendations (1, 2, 5, 8, 19, 21 and 26) there is a divergence of view as to the timing and character of Presidential action. Some parties believe that the President should move promptly

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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to endorse these recommendations and, specifically, that he should require the development of appropriate executive orders and draft legislation for his review and approval prior to September 1, 1975. Others, however, referring to the continuing work of the Church and Pike Committees, and to the likely prospect that these committees will recommend significant changes in the intelligence community, urge that the President establish an Ad Hoc group of his principal advisers for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive study of these "basic issues." This group would develop an options paper containing detailed proposals for dealing with the above seven recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission as well as these more fundamental questions:

-- What is the role of intelligence in the national policy process? How should the intelligence community be organized to fulfill this role? Should there be a supra-agency Director (or Coordinator) of National Intelligence? If so, what should be his charter vis-a-vis the community in terms of resource allocation, intelligence budget development, and management of the CIA? What should be his relationship to the President?

-- What are the roles of the NSC and OMB in providing guidance to and management of the intelligence community?

-- What are the roles of the NSC, the PFIAB and the Congress in oversight of the intelligence community?

-- What is the Administration's policy on the conduct of covert actions?

-- What are the limits of CIA authority to conduct activities within the United States?

The two approaches for dealing with these "basic issues" (1) endorsing the seven Rockefeller recommendations now and dealing with the other "basic issues" as they arise, versus (2) treating the seven major Rockefeller recommendations and the above "basic issues" in a major study effort will both be reflected in the memorandum to the President.

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The purpose of this memorandum is to determine whether Secretary Schlesinger would support either of these approaches, and if not, to solicit his recommendations as to an alternative approach.

Robert C. McFarlane

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Lt. Colonel - U. S. Marine Corps

Military Assistant to the Assistant
to the President for National
Security Affairs

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE ✓
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Report of the Commission on Central Intelligence
Activities Within the United States

On January 4, 1975, I established a Commission on Central Intelligence Activities Within the United States to determine whether any domestic activities of the CIA exceeded the Agency's statutory authority. The Commission has completed its work and has submitted a report which contains a number of recommendations for changes in the framework within which U.S. intelligence activities are conducted. I have reviewed the report and believe that it establishes a sound basis for addressing structural and other possible weaknesses in the operation of the CIA and other intelligence bodies.

It is vital to the national security and foreign policy of the United States that we preserve and strengthen our intelligence institutions and capabilities. It is equally important that all government intelligence activities strictly observe constitutional guarantees against the violation of individual civil liberties. Within this context, I request that you review the report and provide me your comments on the report and its recommendations as soon as possible.

Gerald R. Ford